

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

12 April 1983

Mr. Jed Snyder
International Security Studies Program
Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars
Smithsonian Institution Building
Washington, D.C. 20560

Dear Jed,

Thank you for your note of April 8, and
I would be delighted to meet you again for
lunch.

[redacted]
[redacted] I will call you
in mid-May to arrange for time and place.

Best regards.

Sincerely,



Milton Kovner

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THE WILSON CENTER

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
STUDIES PROGRAM

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April 8, 1983

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Mr. Milton Kovner
National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe
Central Intelligence Agency
Room #7E62
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Kovner:

You may recall we met at the recent State Department conference on "Europe's Southern Tier" where I presented a paper on "NATO's Southern Flank: Toward A New Strategic View."

I thought you might be interested in reading the enclosed piece which was commissioned by USIA on "Nuclear Deterrence and European Security" which appeared on the USIA European Wireless File on April 4.


I emphasize this piece is written for a European audience and as a result, it tends to focus on the deterrent value of the new INF systems as opposed to dwelling on the more neuralgic aspects which are fueling the debate against these weapons.

I would like to arrange for us to have lunch soon and perhaps chat about the Southern Flank. As I mentioned, I am about to begin work on a contract for Richard Perle on the strategic aspects of the Southern region and I would benefit greatly from talking with you and your staff. I am tentatively scheduled to travel to Europe in late October or early November, 1983.

I have enclosed copies of my c.v. and biographical sketch, for your information. May I call your office soon for an appointment?

Best regards.

Sincerely,



Jed Snyder
Research Associate

Enclosures

A Freeze Rewards Moscow

By Jed C. Snyder

WASHINGTON — Proposals for an immediate halt to the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons have gained international attention just as President Reagan's multi-year program for strategic nuclear modernization has begun. Yet a nuclear freeze would hurt America's ability to regain a credible deterrent posture that has been allowed to atrophy for 15 years. A freeze would be bad arms control.

Freeze proponents ignore the importance of deterrence in Western security policy. Nuclear arms will continue to be the critical variable in international relations, particularly between the superpowers. We may deplore the moral consequences of that situation but we should at least recognize reality. Nuclear weapons are not weapons of war, but instruments of deterrence. Our nuclear deterrence will remain credible only if the weapons systems on which the theory rests are periodically modernized to insure operational readiness and stability.

Arguing that we can "blow up the world several times over" is irrelevant. What is important is not the total number of warheads or launchers but the quality of that force, which largely depends upon military research and engineering programs. Deterrence is not a static but a dynamic concept: We cannot deploy nuclear weapons

By comparison, America has virtually ignored its strategic nuclear inventory. No new ICBM's have been deployed since 1970; no new intercontinental bomber has been deployed for more than two decades; we have just begun to deploy the Trident submarines (the first new ballistic-missile submarine built since 1967), and only one new type of submarine-launched ballistic missile has been introduced since SALT I. In effect, we adopted a unilateral nuclear freeze in the late 1960's, to which Moscow responded with an unprecedented buildup. The result is a sizeable Soviet numerical advantage in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, ballistic missile warheads and intermediate-range nuclear systems. While numerical superiority is not the sole criterion for strategic advantage, as asymmetry grows so does the potential for increased political leverage.

European governments have not embraced the freeze concept for an obvious reason: Nuclear arms represent the ultimate deterrent to Soviet conventional-war aggression in Europe. Since the conventional-weapons balance is unlikely to shift in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's favor, the need for nuclear arms is likely to continue.

The freeze is not verifiable. To monitor Soviet compliance with a comprehensive freeze, we would have to be confident that Soviet production and deployment has stopped. This is virtually impossible if we restrict monitoring arrangements to systems under national control (for example, photo-reconnaissance satellites) as against more intrusive measures such as on-site inspection. Our Government's effort at verification suggests that nonintrusive measures are ineffective in tracking Soviet military production. In addition, the Soviet Union has frustrated our attempts to monitor its missile testing and production by masking radio signals that provide data critical to our evaluation of Soviet missile performance. This violates the spirit, if not the letter, of SALT II's compliance provisions.

A freeze would remove any incentive for Moscow to negotiate seriously, and thus erase the possibility of significant bilateral arms reductions. The need for such incentives has been amply demonstrated. During the antiballistic missile debate, for example, Moscow refused to negotiate until the Senate appropriated funds for construction of an ABM system. Similarly, Moscow refused to seriously discuss intermediate-range nuclear force arms control until the 1979 NATO decision to deploy Pershing 2 and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe.

In sum, a comprehensive nuclear weapons freeze is not in America's and NATO's strategic interests. The reasonable and obvious political and military arguments against a freeze need to be addressed rationally.

Jed C. Snyder, senior special assistant to the director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs from April 1981 to October 1982, is a research associate at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

It ignores the value of deterrence

and naively assume that they will remain permanently effective.

A freeze would reward a persistent Soviet military buildup and penalize some 15 years of unilateral American restraint. Since the ratification of SALT I, in 1972, half the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile force has been replaced with 10 variants of three new systems; more than 200 Soviet Backfire bombers (with intercontinental range if refueled) have been deployed; 60 ballistic missile submarines have entered service in five new or improved classes; and about half the Soviet Union's submarine-launched ballistic missiles have been replaced by three new types.

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Next 8 Page(s) In Document Denied

STORY: EULOG0404

DATE: 04/04/83

*EUR-111 (04/04/83)

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EUROPEAN WIRELESS FILE MONDAY, APRIL 4, 1983 NO. 64

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101	NEWS ROUNDUP.....	1,250
102	NOTE TO POSTS RE WEEKEND USINFO TRAFFIC.....	150
103	A CLEAR CASE OF FORGERY (VOA EDITORIAL).....	400
104	A QUICK RESPONSE TO THE POPAYAN DISASTER (VOA EDITORIAL).....	400
105*	NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY BY JED SNYDER (BYLINER ON INF).....	1,800
106	SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER BEGINS FIRST MISSION (ARTICLE FROM FLORIDA ON SHUTTLE LAUNCH).....	700
107	ADD NEWS ROUNDUP.....	250
108	WHITE HOUSE REPORT.....	700
109	ECONOMIC HIGHLIGHTS.....	700
110	STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT.....	2,600
111	EULOG.....	300

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NOTE: ADDENDUM FILE FOLLOWS REGULAR EU WF TRANSMISSION TODAY

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X FILE: MONTREAL, BRUSSELS: FRENCH TRANSLATIONS.....1,370

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(MORE)

STORY: EU1050404

DATE: 04/04/83

*EUR-105 (04/04/83)

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NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY (1,800)

BY JED C. SNYDER

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(JED C. SNYDER, SENIOR SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR OF POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS AT THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE FROM APRIL 1981 TO OCTOBER 1982, IS A RESEARCH ASSOCIATE AT THE WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS AND A GUEST SCHOLAR AT THE FOREIGN POLICY INSTITUTE, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.)

*

FEW DECISIONS BY THE ALLIANCE HAVE BEEN AS CONTROVERSIAL OR AS PAINFUL AS THE DECEMBER 1979 DECISION TO DEPLOY 572 NEW INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) IN EUROPE. ALTHOUGH NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE DOMINATED THE CONCERNS OF EUROPEANS SINCE THE FORMATION OF NATO IN 1949, THE DECEMBER DECISION HAS HIGHLIGHTED TWO CORE ISSUES OF EUROPEAN SECURITY (1) HOW TO MOST EFFECTIVELY DETER SOVIET AGGRESSION IN WESTERN EUROPE, AND (2) HOW TO MANAGE A POLITICALLY DIFFICULT DEPLOYMENT DECISION IN THE FACE OF A SIGNIFICANT BUILDUP OF OPPOSING SYSTEMS BY THE SOVIET UNION.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND--

ON DECEMBER 12, 1979, THE 15 (NOW 16) MEMBERS OF THE NATO COUNCIL

(MORE)

STORY: EU1050404

PAGE:

2

VOTED UNANIMOUSLY TO MODERNIZE THE EUROPEAN-BASED NUCLEAR FORCES BY DEPLOYING A TOTAL OF 108 PERSHING II BALLISTIC MISSILES AND 464 GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (GLCM) IN FIVE NATO COUNTRIES -- WEST GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN, BELGIUM, ITALY, AND THE NETHERLANDS. THESE TWO

SYSTEMS WOULD PERMIT NATO TO STRIKE SOVIET TERRITORY FROM WESTERN EUROPEAN MISSILE SITES FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. THOR AND JUPITER MISSILES IN ITALY AND TURKEY. NATO EMPHASIZED THIS DECISION WAS NOT INTENDED TO ESCALATE THE EAST-WEST ARMS COMPETITION, BUT TO CLOSE A GAP IN WESTERN DETERRENCE WHICH HAD DEVELOPED AS A RESULT OF SOVIET INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE (INF) MODERNIZATION, IN PARTICULAR THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MOBILE, MULTI-WARHEAD SS-20 MISSILE, WHOSE RANGE OF 3,000 MILES WOULD ALLOW WIDE TARGET COVERAGE OF MUCH OF WESTERN EUROPE. TO UNDERScore NATO'S DETERMINATION TO ENGAGE THE SOVIET UNION IN AN ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE, THE ALLIANCE RELEASED A PARALLEL DECLARATION THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD UNDERTAKE -- SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH NATO'S DEPLOYMENT DECISION -- ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS TO STABILIZE THE THEATER NUCLEAR BALANCE. THIS "TWO TRACK" DECISION ALSO EMBODIED A LARGER POLICY DECISION -- THAT WHILE NATO WAS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS, IT WAS NOT WILLING TO ALLOW THE SOVIET NUCLEAR BUILDUP IN EUROPE TO CONTINUE WITHOUT AN APPROPRIATE WESTERN POLITICAL-MILITARY RESPONSE.

BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION BEGAN IN GENEVA IN NOVEMBER 1981 AND CONTINUE TODAY. TO EMPHASIZE WESTERN COMMITMENT TO THE ARMS CONTROL TRACK OF THE DECEMBER DECISION, PRESIDENT REAGAN ANNOUNCED THAT NATO WAS PREPARED TO FOREGO DEPLOYMENT

(MORE)

STORY: EU1050404

PAGE:

3

OF THE 572 PERSHING II AND CRUISE MISSILES, PROVIDED THE SOVIET UNION WOULD DISMANTLE THE LARGE NUMBERS OF SS-4, SS-5, AND SS-20 MISSILES TARGETTED AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE AND ASIA.

STRATEGIC INTEGRITY AND WESTERN DETERRENCE --

THE DECEMBER 1979 DECISION HAS REVIVED A DEBATE AS OLD AS THE ALLIANCE ITSELF -- THE PROPER ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN NATO'S STRATEGY AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE DETERRENCE OF CONFLICT IN EUROPE, AND INDIRECTLY, REINFORCING THE CREDIBILITY OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE NATO TREATY WHICH AFFIRMS THAT "THE PARTIES AGREE THAT AN ARMED ATTACK AGAINST ONE OR MORE OF THEM IN EUROPE OR NORTH AMERICA SHALL BE CONSIDERED AN ATTACK AGAINST THEM ALL...." ALTHOUGH THIS CLAUSE HAS BECOME ALMOST A CLICHE, IT IS IN FACT THE FOUNDATION FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN EUROPE AND HAS OBVIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY. THE GUARANTEE IN NATO'S CHARTER WOULD FACE ITS ULTIMATE TEST DURING A CRISIS WHERE BOTH THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO LEADERSHIP MIGHT BE FORCED ULTIMATELY WITH CONTEMPLATING THE POSSIBILITY OF A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE. IN SUCH A SITUATION, THE "STRATEGIC INTEGRITY" OF NATO WOULD BE TESTED; I.E. WOULD THE ALLIANCE BE ABLE TO COME TO AGREEMENT ON THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE EXECUTION (IF WARRANTED) OF A NUCLEAR RELEASE DECISION.

THAT DECISION WOULD BE BASED ON MANY FACTORS, PROMINENT AMONG THEM IS NATO'S CAPABILITY TO RESPOND IN KIND TO A WARSAW PACT ATTACK IN WESTERN EUROPE, BY STRIKING SOVIET TERRITORY WITH LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS. THE DECEMBER 1979 DECISION WILL ALLOW THE ALLIANCE TO RETALIATE AS A LAST RESORT, IN A MANNER WHICH WILL SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE

(MORE)

STORY: EU1050404

PAGE: 4

CREDIBILITY OF NATO'S NUCLEAR DETERRENT. THIS IN TURN WILL STRENGTHEN THE LINK BETWEEN NATO'S NUCLEAR FORCES AND THE "ULTIMATE" DETERRENT -- U.S. STRATEGIC WEAPONS. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE U.S. DETERRENT REPRESENTS (FOR BOTH MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON) THE LINK WHICH BRIDGES 3,000 MILES OF OCEAN. THUS, ANY MEASURES WHICH WILL REINFORCE THAT LINK WILL INCREASE THE SECURITY OF ALL THE ALLIES. THE "572" DECISION PROVIDES THAT REINFORCEMENT.

THE EVOLVING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT --

MUCH OF WHAT THE U.S. HAS DONE, IN CONCERT WITH ITS ALLIES SINCE THE LATE 1950'S HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO BOLSTERING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE NATO DETERRENT. IN THE 1950'S, DELIVERY TECHNOLOGY WAS SUCH THAT RETALIATORY WEAPONS HAD TO BE DEPLOYED ON EUROPEAN TERRITORY TO ENABLE COVERAGE OF TARGETS DEEP WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION. FOR THIS REASON, THE FIRST STRATEGIC BOMBERS DEPLOYED BY THE U.S. WERE BASED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE FIRST BALLISTIC MISSILES DEVELOPED BY THE U.S. WERE DEPLOYED ON BRITISH, ITALIAN AND TURKISH BASES.

IN THE FOLLOWING DECADE, THE SOVIETS EMBARKED ON A BUILDUP OF THEIR MISSILE ARSENAL DEPLOYED AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE, A BUILDUP WHICH CONTINUES TODAY. THE PROGRAM TO EXPAND U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES IN THE EARLY 1960'S WAS IN PART A RESPONSE TO THIS NEW THREAT TO OUR ALLIES. THIS RESPONSE WAS OF SUCH SPEED AND MAGNITUDE THAT IT ASSURED U.S. STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY OVER THE USSR FOR MORE THAN A DECADE, AND THUS PUT TO REST ANY LINGERING DOUBTS ABOUT THE ULTIMATE CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC UMBRELLA. BUT THESE DOUBTS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ERASED WITHOUT THE PARALLEL STRENGTHENING OF NATO'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES, WHICH

(MORE)

STORY: EU1050404

PAGE:

5

MADE THE THREAT OF EFFECTIVE ALLIANCE RESPONSE TO ANY WARSAW PACT AGGRESSION AT ANY LEVEL MORE CREDIBLE. AS PART OF NATO'S CONTINUING EFFORT TO MODERNIZE ITS DETERRENT, THE ALLIANCE OFFICIALLY ADOPTED IN 1967, A POLICY OF "FLEXIBLE RESPONSE." IT IS A RATHER BRILLIANT COMPROMISE BETWEEN EUROPEAN ANXIETIES ABOUT A PROLONGED CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR CONFLICT CONFINED TO EUROPE, AND THE U.S. CONCERN ABOUT A RAPID ESCALATION TO INTERCONTINENTAL NUCLEAR EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIET UNION. FLEXIBLE RESPONSE MAY BE DEFINED AS THE ABILITY TO RESPOND TO THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AT A LEVEL APPROPRIATE TO THE ATTACK. THERE ARE TWO COMPONENTS TO THIS THEORY: (1) INCREASED RELIANCE ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE, AND (2) FORMULATION OF A NUCLEAR DOCTRINE THAT PROVIDES TARGETTING OPTIONS SHORT OF MASSIVE STRIKES, IN AN ATTEMPT TO SHIFT FROM THE "ALL OR NONE" PRINCIPLE EMBODIED IN THE DOCTRINE OF MASSIVE RETALIATION.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WITHOUT THE IMPROVEMENT OF NUCLEAR FORCES BASED IN EUROPE IN ORDER TO MAKE THE THREAT OF ESCALATION TO THE NUCLEAR LEVEL MORE CREDIBLE, AND TO PROVIDE A VISIBLE AND EFFECTIVE LINK BETWEEN THEATRE DEFENSE AND U.S. STRATEGIC SYSTEMS.

THE MASSIVE SOVIET NUCLEAR BUILDUP OF THE 1970'S CONFIRMS THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS MOVED TOWARD A POLICY OF TARGETTING BOTH THE CONTINENTAL U.S. AND EUROPE, IN A TRANSPARENT EFFORT TO SPLIT THE ALLIANCE. NATO HAS MOVED TO TURN BACK THIS SOVIET EFFORT TO DECOUPLE EUROPE FROM THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR UMBRELLA, BY DECIDING TO DEPLOY LONG RANGE INF SYSTEMS WHICH WILL ENSURE A CREDIBLE RESPONSE TO ANY SOVIET

(MORE)

AGGRESSION.

A CREDIBLE PROGRAM FOR DETERRENCE --

THE COMPREHENSIVE NATURE OF THE GROWING SOVIET THREAT REQUIRES AN EQUALLY COMPREHENSIVE NATO RESPONSE IF THE ALLIANCE IS TO SUSTAIN ITS DETERRENT STRATEGY AND MAINTAIN A STABLE PEACE. NATO MUST, AT THE CONVENTIONAL LEVEL, MAINTAIN ITS CAPABILITY TO CONFINE CONFLICT FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. TO DO SO NATO MUST MAINTAIN AND, WHERE POSSIBLE INCREASE CURRENT FORCE LEVELS WHILE REASSERTING THAT TRADITIONAL ADVANTAGE IN THE QUALITY OF ITS MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AND IN THE TRAINING, AND MORALE OF ITS FORCES, ALL OF WHICH HAVE HITHERTO COMPENSATED FOR WARSAW PACT MANPOWER ADVANTAGES.

SECONDLY, THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES MUST TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THE SURVIVABILITY OF BOTH INTERCONTINENTAL AND EUROPEAN BASED NUCLEAR FORCES. VULNERABLE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS INVITE PREEMPTIVE ATTACK. GIVEN SOVIET ADVANCES IN ACCURACY, NEITHER DISTANCE, NOR HARDNESS, NOR DEPTH CAN PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR NATO'S NUCLEAR ASSETS. GREATER CAPABILITY FOR MOBILITY AND DISPERSION, THEREFORE, ARE NEEDED TO ENHANCE THE SURVIVABILITY OF THESE SYSTEMS. PERSHING II AND GLCM WILL PROVIDE THAT ASSURANCE.

THIRDLY, FOR NATO TO MAINTAIN, IN THE FACE OF THE SOVIET BUILDUP, THE CREDIBILITY OF ITS THREAT TO ESCALATE A CONFLICT TO THE NUCLEAR LEVEL, IF ALL ELSE FAILS, IT MUST REINFORCE THE LINK BETWEEN THE INTERCONTINENTAL AND EUROPEAN BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. THE SOVIET UNION MUST NEVER BE ALLOWED TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE EXISTS ANY LEVEL OF

(MORE)

STORY: EU1050404

PAGE:

7

EUROPEAN CONFLICT AT WHICH IT COULD WIN, WITHOUT CAUSING NATO TO ESCALATE THE CONFLICT TO A HIGHER LEVEL. TO ALLOW A GAP TO EMERGE IN THE SPECTRUM OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE WOULD FOSTER SUCH A DANGEROUS ILLUSION.

THE DECEMBER 1979 DECISION TO DEPLOY NEW INF SYSTEMS IN EUROPE IS A PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF NATO'S DETERRENT STRATEGY. THE NEW SYSTEMS WILL BE MOBILE AND THEY WILL DISPERSE IN TIMES OF CRISIS THUS ENHANCING THE SURVIVABILITY OF NATO'S NUCLEAR FORCES. THESE SYSTEMS ARE ACCURATE, AND THEIR VERY EXISTENCE WILL FORCE ANY AGGRESSOR TO DISPERSE HIS FORCES MORE WIDELY, AND ADOPT LESS EFFICIENT MODES OF CONVENTIONAL ATTACK EVEN AT THE EARLY STAGES OF ANY CONFLICT, THUS REDUCING ANY INCENTIVE FOR MILITARY INITIATIVES. THESE SYSTEMS CAN REACH INTO THE SOVIET UNION. THUS THEIR DEPLOYMENT TO EUROPE WILL FORCE UPON THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP THE REALIZATION THAT SOVIET TERRITORY CANNOT ACT AS A SANCTUARY, FROM WHICH LONG RANGE MISSILES LIKE THE SS-20, OR AIRCRAFT LIKE THE BACKFIRE, COULD THREATEN WESTERN EUROPE WITHOUT FEAR OF A RESPONSE ON SOVIET TERRITORY. FINALLY, THESE SYSTEMS WILL BE BASED IN FIVE NATO COUNTRIES THUS REINFORCING THE CONCEPT OF SHARED RISK, AND SHARED EFFORT, AND SHARED SECURITY UPON WHICH THE WESTERN ALLIANCE IS BASED.

UNFORTUNATELY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE ASSUMED A PARAMOUNT ROLE IN THE CONDUCT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. NOWHERE IS THIS MORE OBVIOUS THAN IN EUROPE, WHERE A HEALTHY DEBATE HAS BEEN PROVOKED OVER THE PROPER ROLE OF THESE HORRIBLY DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS. IT IS CRITICAL TO REMEMBER THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE NOT WEAPONS OF

(MORE)

STORY: EU1050404

PAGE:

8

WAR, BUT INSTRUMENTS OF DETERRENCE AND AS A RESULT, MUCH EFFORT MUST BE INVESTED TO ENSURE THE CREDIBILITY OF THAT DETERRENT. THAT CREDIBILITY WILL ONLY BE RETAINED BY PERIODIC MODERNIZATION WHICH RECOGNIZES BOTH THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP AND THE VERY SOBER FACT THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS PERHAPS IRONICALLY HAVE KEPT THE PEACE IN EUROPE FOR MORE THAN THIRTY YEARS.

AT THE SAME TIME, THE ALLIANCE APPRECIATES THE VALUE OF A CONTINUED ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE WITH MOSCOW AND THAT REALIZATION IS EMBODIED IN THE CURRENT GENEVA TALKS WHERE SERIOUS EFFORTS ARE UNDERWAY TO ULTIMATELY REMOVE AN ENTIRE CLASS OF WEAPONS FROM THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT.

THE PROTECTION OF WESTERN VALUES AND FREEDOMS REQUIRES CONSTANT ATTENTION AND, ON OCCASION, CONSIDERABLE INVESTMENT. THE OBVIOUS FACT THAT THOSE VALUES HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY RETAINED, ARGUES FOR A CONTINUED COURSE OF SUSTAINED DETERRENCE.

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